This reading considers the use of internet filtering, how it is enforced, the most effective methods, the implications of such practices and the scope of transparency and accountability of those responsible for enforcing filtering systems.
Fundamentally filters exist to deny a user access to information. It can be done in such a way that the person does not know the content has actually been filtered. The reasons for the use of filters vary and can be technological, cultural, political, economic or several/all of said reasons.
The chapter details two types of filtering, the first is address blocking which is whereby routers are configured to deny access to certain internet protocol (IP) addresses, domain names or specific servers running on a particular port number. In practice this is usually done for localised filtering, for example denying access to websites deemed illegal in certain states of the United States.
The second is content analysis and filtering is based on the content itself. The filter compares the website requested to a blacklist of certain words and/or URLs. If the website requested matches anything on the blacklist then access will be denied by the filter.
Other types of filtering exist such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS attacks) among others. Yet fundamentally they all exist to achieve the same goal, the suppression of information.
Whilst the text categorises filtering into two types, one could argue that a third category exists, what I would call ‘source filtering’ which would include methods such as DDoS attacks and deliberate power outages, which serve to remove information at the source. This makes it inaccessible to all users rather than simply blocking it from view for a select few, as both other types of filtering aim to achieve.
As technology evolves so have the tools used for content filtering. Thanks to ever increasing sophistication, authorities are quicker to respond to new modes of communication used to circumvent filters. However this has proven to be an endless process whereby users are always seeking and finding new ways to circumvent filters and consequently, it is always the authorities who must respond to these new methods, as they cannot pre-empt them.
Further to this, filtering, beyond its arguably inherent negative aspects (i.e. the act of filtering itself) is the fact filters are largely imperfect and can result in collateral filtering. I.e. where websites are blocked because they may have the same IP address as an infringing website or may contain keywords but in a context that does not necessitate their filtering. For example a specific keyword could be ‘Nazism’ to block Neo-Nazi websites but at the same time accidently blocks historical websites detailing the history and actions of the Nazis.
Ignoring the question of whether or not filtering is acceptable, the text has shown that filtering in itself is not perfect technologically and users will always eventually succeed in circumventing such measures. Further to this as the reading has demonstrated, filtering will only lead to more filtering due to the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding the practice. It suggests that filtering will always be something against the public will, when many governments go so far as to try and hide their filters from the very citizens they are used on.
Bibliography:
Deibert, R. J., (n. d.). The geopolitics of internet control: Censorship, sovereignty, and cyberspace. In: A. Chadwick, and P. N Howard, eds. 2008. Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics. London. Routledge. pp. 323-336.