Monday, 27 February 2012

The geopolitics of internet control: Censorship, sovereignty, and cyberspace.

This reading considers the use of internet filtering, how it is enforced, the most effective methods, the implications of such practices and the scope of transparency and accountability of those responsible for enforcing filtering systems.

Fundamentally filters exist to deny a user access to information. It can be done in such a way that the person does not know the content has actually been filtered. The reasons for the use of filters vary and can be technological, cultural, political, economic or several/all of said reasons.

The chapter details two types of filtering, the first is address blocking which is whereby routers are configured to deny access to certain internet protocol (IP) addresses, domain names or specific servers running on a particular port number. In practice this is usually done for localised filtering, for example denying access to websites deemed illegal in certain states of the United States.

The second is content analysis and filtering is based on the content itself. The filter compares the website requested to a blacklist of certain words and/or URLs. If the website requested matches anything on the blacklist then access will be denied by the filter. 

Other types of filtering exist such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS attacks) among others. Yet fundamentally they all exist to achieve the same goal, the suppression of information.

Whilst the text categorises filtering into two types, one could argue that a third category exists, what I would call ‘source filtering’ which would include methods such as DDoS attacks and deliberate power outages, which serve to remove information at the source. This makes it inaccessible to all users rather than simply blocking it from view for a select few, as both other types of filtering aim to achieve. 

As technology evolves so have the tools used for content filtering. Thanks to ever increasing sophistication, authorities are quicker to respond to new modes of communication used to circumvent filters. However this has proven to be an endless process whereby users are always seeking and finding new ways to circumvent filters and consequently, it is always the authorities who must respond to these new methods, as they cannot pre-empt them. 

Further to this, filtering, beyond its arguably inherent negative aspects (i.e. the act of filtering itself) is the fact filters are largely imperfect and can result in collateral filtering. I.e. where websites are blocked because they may have the same IP address as an infringing website or may contain keywords but in a context that does not necessitate their filtering. For example a specific keyword could be ‘Nazism’ to block Neo-Nazi websites but at the same time accidently blocks historical websites detailing the history and actions of the Nazis.

Ignoring the question of whether or not filtering is acceptable, the text has shown that filtering in itself is not perfect technologically and users will always eventually succeed in circumventing such measures. Further to this as the reading has demonstrated, filtering will only lead to more filtering due to the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding the practice. It suggests that filtering will always be something against the public will, when many governments go so far as to try and hide their filters from the very citizens they are used on.


Bibliography:

Deibert, R. J., (n. d.). The geopolitics of internet control: Censorship, sovereignty, and cyberspace. In: A. Chadwick, and P. N Howard, eds. 2008. Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics. London. Routledge. pp. 323-336.

The internet in U.S. election campaigns

This reading examines the use of the internet for political campaigns in the United States. The internet has evolved and its usage by campaigns has evolved in parallel. Consequently the adoption of the internet by campaigners can be split into several distinct phases of development.

The first of these stages was the discovery phase, which occurred from around 1992 to 1999 as it marked the first presidential candidates to incorporate the internet into their campaigns for the presidency in 1992. Throughout this stage the internet was used by campaigns primarily for the dissemination of information, such as speeches through basic websites and email.

The second stage is the maturation phase, in this stage the use of websites by campaigners was the norm. Most political candidates in various capacities (such as presidential or congressional) maintained increasingly sophisticated websites with various interactive features, such as instant messaging or games to encourage user interaction with the material and other likeminded voters.

The third and final phase documented so far is the post-maturation phase where campaigns began to reach out beyond the limitations of their own websites, to embrace both media and user controlled online communications in order to appeal to the wider electorate.  

The text shows that the internet has become a greater and greater part of political campaigns. Email has revolutionised the way campaigns can communicate not only internally but also with their supporters, allowing for a relatively cheap yet extremely easy and efficient way to manage their affairs and interact with millions of voters. Candidates without large financial backing can reap the rewards from many small online donations allowing them to compete evenly with opponents who already have sound financial backing. The internet has allowed for easier acquisition and dissemination of information on a huge scale yet cheaply or for free. Similarly online advertising in the post maturation phase has proven far cheaper than its television counterpart and yet is able to reach much the same number of viewers.

However the internet has not proved to be a perfect technology for campaigns. Email, whilst extremely helpful to campaigns, isn’t able to appeal to anyone beyond their own supporters, limiting its use. Yet wherever limitations such as this have occurred campaigns have evolved in response. The post-maturation phase marks the stage where campaigns moved beyond the limitations of their own websites to embrace for example; blogs, news websites and social networking websites. Creating a presence that could appeal to the greater electorate rather than just their own.

Yet the internet also proved that whatever the online support for a candidate, no matter how big, it mustn’t be mistaken as a sample that truly represents the entire electorate as the demographics of the electorate have varying presences online. Therefore the use of television and print remain an extremely important part of campaign efforts to ensure maximum exposure across all demographics.

Thus we can see that the internet can be used well to supplement existing campaign infrastructure and the use of the internet should continue to develop alongside the development of the internet itself. However whilst the internet has become an integral part of campaign operations, it cannot function alone and should not be solely relied upon by candidates. However this is not to say this cannot or will not change with time.


Bibliography:

Baumgartner, J. C. and Davis, R. and Francia, P. L. and Morris, J. S., (n. d.). The internet in U.S. election campaigns. In: A. Chadwick, and P. N Howard, eds. 2008. Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics. London. Routledge. pp. 13-24.